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Abstract- Electronic commerce has attracted much attention
with the development of security technology on the Internet. We
established an electronic commerce system that is based on NTT
electronic money technology and is connected with the Japanese
banking system. It has been operated in the InternetCash trial
step2 since April 1999. The aim of this trial is to evaluate the
security features of NTT electronic money and to verify the
merits of electronic money for consumers and other parties
concerned.
In this paper, we introduce the whole service
concept of this trial, discuss the problems and solutions related
to the design of the system, and report on the current results of
the trial.

Issuer

I. INTRODUCTION
The interestin electroniccommerceon the Internethasrecently
grown,anda numberof paymentsystemson the Internethavebeen
introduced.Thesesystemsarebasedon eitherthe electronicmoney
systemsuchas Mondex [l], e&h [24], and Millicent [5], or the
existing credit card system such as SET (secure electronic
transaction)[6]. Each system has its own characteristicsand
advantagesthat suit it to a particular market. However, their
commongoal is the realizationof secureand low-cost electronic
commerceonthe Internet
We have developed an electronic payment system called
InternetCash that is based on NTT electronic money
technology [7-91. It is connected to the Japanesebanking
systemand hasbeen working under the service ‘InternetCash
trial step2’ since April 1999 after the successful half-year
preliminary trial (stepl) from September 1998 to February
1999.
It is very important to discusshow a new payment system
such as electronic money should be designedso as to fit in
with the society. Thus, we introduce in this paper not only
the whole concept of NTT electronic money (section II) but
also our solution to the problems encountered during the
design of the InternetCash system (section III), which is
reliable enoughto work in the society.
II. SERVICE CONCEPTS OFNTT ELECTRONIC MONEY
A.

Transaction

The basic schemeof NTT electronic money is shown in
Fig. 1. The issueris an organization that managesthe issued
and returned electronic money and detects illegal use, which
also enables the unification of the electronic money
distributed by the several banks. Each bank managesits own
user accounts and deals with the user’s requests for
withdrawal and deposit of electronic money. The electronic
money is ‘charged’ on a tamper-resistantdevice, such as a

Fig. 1: Basic scheme of NTT

electronic

money.

smart card WI which prevent.s it from being used illegallY7
so that the userscan buy goods in the shopson the Internet.
They can also senda remittance to another user with only
the smart card, involving no central server. Thus we can
prevent the transactions from concentrating in the central
server. It is the most characteristic service of the electronic
money; it gives value to digital data itself based on
encryption technology and enables instantaneoussettlement
through the simple exchange of data between the two parties
concerned.
Furthermore they can convert the issuedelectronic money
into real money in the account of the bank as shownin Fig. 1.
This feature is not available in most electronic commerce
systems,but we consider it important becauseit distinguishes
the electronic money from the usualprepaid card.
B. Properties
1) Advancedsecurity: To prevent illegal use, the electronic
money data and the key data for encryption or digital
signature are stored on tamper-resistant smart cards. The
encryption process of the electronic money is done with a
processorin eachsmart card, making it impossibleto illegally
tamper with electronic money even if data transactions
between the card and an outside party are monitored and
analyzed. This is a secure method as long as the tamperresistantcharacteristicsare guaranteed.
However, it may be possibleto tamper with the smart cards
by spendinga certain amount of time and money. Therefore,
we have adopted the digital signature technology to ensure
that illegal usecan be detected and traced even if the tamperresistant characteristics of smart cards become corruptible.
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communication when dealing with money. It is impossible to
cancel the payment after the payment signature is created by
a smart card or the withdrawal request is accepted by the real
banking system.

Fig. 2: The data structure

of InternetCash.

The left side of Fig. 2 describesthe data structure of NTT
electronic money just after User A is received 10,000 yen
from the issuer. If User A pays User B 1,000 yen of 10,000
yen, the amount is deducted from User A’s electronic money
data, and the data shown in the middle of the figure is
transferred to User B. Note that the payers attach a payment
history consisting of the payer’s signature to the original
electronic money and that the payer’s public key is certified
by the issuer. When the electronic money returns to the
issuer, it can detect overspending by checking this payment
history unlessthe issuer’ssecretkey is broken. For example,
if User B overspends 1000 yen (to User D) even though he
hasalready spent 500 yen (to User C) as shown in the right of
the figure, the payment histories attachedby the B-C and B-D
transfers contradict each other, becausethe total amount of
electronic money spent is greater than the amount received
from User A. This check exposesUser B’s overspending.
2) &+vLz~: Here, privacy meansthat no information about
the user’s actual identity can be revealed with the electronic
money data itself and the information managedby eachentity.
We substitute a public key as an identifier in a payment,
which can be consideredto be a pseudonymof the user. By
attaching only a pseudonymto the electronic money data, the
usercan ensurethat no trace can be madefrom the electronic
money data on what was purchasedand where, thus ensuring
privacy. However, when the issuer detects illegal use, it
traces the user with the cooperation of the bank that has the
account information of the users. Our privacy is compatible
with the detection of illegal use.

Thus, we created a transaction resumption mechanism,
which enables any interrupted transaction to be continued
from the state just prior to the interruption. It works as
follows. The server generatesa transaction ID and passesit
to the client when a transaction is established. The server
storesthe transaction ID and the transaction statusat certain
checkpoints in a databasewith the other information needed
to resume the transaction. The client also stores the
transaction ID, the transaction status, and its related data in
the smart card which can be carried with the user. If the
transaction is interrupted by some troubles, the client can
resume the transaction by requesting the server with the
information stored in the smart card.
So far we have discussed our transaction resumption
mechanism, but it is not enough. This is because the
exchange of personalremittance data dependson the existing
E-mail protocol. Now we introduce how to deal with the loss
of E-mailed data.
B. Exchanging remittance data via E-mail
There are several ways for the usersto exchange personal
remittance data on the Internet, such as via direct TCP/IP
connection, third-party mediation between the payer and the
payee, and E-mail. We selected the remittance via E-mail,
because it is not interrupted by firewall on the Internet, it
costslessthan developing the third party, and the usersdo not
have to sharethe connection simultaneously.
The payee of the InternetCash first sendsan e-mail with the
request file, which consists of the requesting amount, the
InternetCash’s own request data including designatedpayer’s
identification, the payee’s digital signature, and the payee’s
certification.
An example of creating the InternetCash
payment request file is shown in Fig. 3. The payer who
receives the E-mail deducts the requested amount of
InternetCash from his smart card and sendsback an E-mail
with the payment file, which consists of the InternetCash’s

III. DESIGN OF THE INTERNETCASH SYSTEM
In addition to the advantagesmentioned above, it is very
important to discusshow such a new payment system should
be designed so as to fit in with the existing social systems,
becausethey have the problems such asan unreliability of the
Internet, PC, and the smart card. In this section we present
the solutionsfor them.
A.

Transaction resumption mechanism

The InternetCash system is basedon the distributed clientserver model. For example, four entities, a user’s client PC
with a smart card, an issuerserver, a bank server, and the real
banking system, interact on the Internet.
As the
communication quality of the Internet and PC is unreliable,
we must take into account accidental interruption of

Fig. 3: E-mailing a payment request.
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own data including designated payee’s identification, the
payer’s signature, and the payer’s certification. An example
of creating the InternetCash payment file is shown in Fig. 4.
The payee who receives the E-mail adds the requesting
amount of InternetCash on his smart card.
To deal with the loss of E-mailed data, the InternetCash’s
own data is stored on the payer’s smart card as a backup
InternetCash shown in Fig. 5, so that a user can regenerate
the payment file. The user cannot create another payment file
without eliminating the backup InternetCash after he or she
makes sure that the payee has received the current
InternetCash transaction.
However, we do not apply the same mechanism to the
InternetCash’s
own requested data including a challenge
generated by an payee, because the capacity of a smart card is
limited and we consider it important that the payee can send

i Hi, Mr. MORI,
:I
Please
pay me
Bye. -- SENDA.

1,OMl

yen

in InternetCash

in a hurry.

the several requestswithout acquiring the InternetCash from
the payers. We instead designedthe smart card so it could
store the small-sized identification of a challenge, and the
challengeitself is sentto the payer and sentback to the payee.
This identification enables a smart card to manage more
requestsand to identify the challengein the received payment
file. Although the payment requestfile cannot be regenerated,
a lossof the file doesnot causea lossof money.
Furthermore we have designed a smart card storing a
number of the partial data of the challengereceived from the
payees, which prevents a payer’s dual payments to the same
request.
C. Refund calculation for broken smart cards
In this subsectionwe introduce the problemscausedby an
unreliability of the smart card and the solution for it. The
payment in our electronic money system does not have to
involve a central server, but only the two entities concerned.
This feature prevents the transactionsfrom concentrating in a
central server and is similar to that of real money, enabling no
entity in our system to monitor the balance on a smart card.
However, as the present smart card is not reliable, we must
have a refund scheme to allow for accidents such as a
breakage,which should be calculated by the central server to
deal with the user’s false return. Though the current refund
can be basically calculated by the bank server connectedwith
real banking system and the issuerserver managing both the
issued and the returned InternetCash, only the remittance
transactionscannot be detected by the servers.
To cope with this dilemma in the trial, we designedthe
client program automatically returning the acquired electronic
money to the bank server and getting the new one with the
sameamount soon after acquiring it, so that the servers can
monitor the balance on a smart card. This is the best way
becauseit does not affect the payment scheme to the shop
and the remittance protocol itself.

Fig. 4: Paying the requested amount of InternetCash.
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One other mechanism is needed to prevent other smart
cards from receiving the InternetCash remitted by the user
who has already been refunded. Thus the public key list of
the refunded users is distributed in the system and the smart
card is designednot to receive the InternetCash including the
public key in the list.
We hope that a reliable smart card or instituted safety
policy, such as insurance,makesall our conceptscompletely
compatible with the needsof society.
D. Connection with the existing trading scheme
We now discuss how our system is connected to the
existing electronic commerce scheme. The mall system,
which we call, is usually operated by a store on the Internet,
managing the information about the store and the trading
processwith the users. The payment processis managedby
another server. Fig. 6 showsthe usual schemeof the mall,
which is designedfor the purposeof connecting with a credit
card payment system. It consistsof the browser, the client
application called wallet , the mall server and the credit card
payment server. After the user decideswhich goods to buy,
the payment is made on the payment server with the data that
is generated by the wallet and sent via the mall server.
However it cannot be easily applied to another payment
system. For the popularization of new payment systems
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IV. CONCLUSION
We have constructed the InternetCash system, which is
reliable enough to deal with the everyday transactions in the
society and can be easily connected with the existing scheme
of electronic commerce. It has been operated by the Cyber
Business Association in Japan with agreement among the
players concerned, such as 4 InternetCash-distributed banks
and more than 30 stores on the Internet [ 121. After the trial is
finished in February 2000, we will evaluate its effectiveness
especially concentrating on the conversion service to real
money and personal remittance service.
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